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Class Gifts of Future Interests: When Is
Survival Required?
Herman L. Trautman*
In this article, Professor Trautman cautions against over-emphasis
upon rules of construction in class gift problems, and urges the courts
to be guided to a greater extent by the probable intent of the donor.
With respect to the survival problem, he suggests that class gifts of
future interests to "children" and "grandchildren" do not imply a re-
quirement of survival to the date of distribution; on the other hand,
he suggests that a survival requirement is implied in class gifts of future
interests to "heirs," "next of kin," and "issue." In view of current tax
law, he recommends that estate planners draft class gifts of future in-
terests as contingent interests in which the class is defined to include
only those who survive the termination of all prior interests and that
no reversionary interests be left in the donor or his estate.
I. INMTODUCTION
Suppose a client consults you concerning the planning and writing
of his will and says that he wants primarily to leave his estate to,
or in trust for, his wife for her life and at her death to their "children."
Or, suppose they have no issue, and at his wife's deirth he wants his
estate to go to his blood relatives-"next of kin," "heirs," "intestate
successors," or the like. In the earlier years of a predominantly agri-
cultural society when the principal asset of an estate was likely to be
farm land, these gifts were typically in the form of a legal life estate
to the wife, with a remaider toh-ie class deignated. In current times
when stocks, bonds and deferred compensation arrangements repre-
sent the larger part of a client's estate, and even farm land is likely
to be incorporated, these gifts are often in the form of a trust for
the life of the wife, the trust to terminate at her death, with a gift
of the remainder to the class.
To what extent should a member of either of these class designa-
tions who is in existence at the client's death be expressly required
to survive the death of the client's wife in order for his interest to
be transmissible from him at his death? Similarly,suppose the gift
of the remainder is to "nephews and nieces" and a nephew-i-b-m
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after the client's death; should he be required to survive the client's
wife in order for his interest to be transmissible from him at his
death? Is there a natural and inherent difference between class gifts
to "children," where all the individuals who can possibly be members
of the class are within the knowledge and control of the client, and
such class designations as "next of kin" or "heirs," who cannot be
positively identified during the client's life? Is there an in-between
category such as class gifts to "grandchildren" and "nephews and
nieces" where some members of the group are likely to be known to
the client but additional members may be born after the client's death
but during the life of his wife?
When should the lawyer who plans an estate and assumes the pro-
fessional responsibility for its proper design expressly require survival
to the death of the client's wife as a condition precedent to the right
to participate in the ultimate distribution of the estate at that time?
Suppose the client should be survived by his wife and two children,
and one child should die thereafter during the life of the client's wife
leaving a family; how will the lawyer prevent a deceased child's
family, as beneficiaries of his estate, from being excluded as partici-
pants in his client's class gift of a future interest? Or, in the case
where there are no issue and the class gift is to "next of kin" and the
like, suppose the client should be survived by his wife and three first
cousins, and one of the cousins should die thereafter during the life
of the client's wife leaving his entire estate by will to a friend. Will
the friend of the cousin be allowed to participate in the ultimate dis-
tribution upon the death of the wife? Lastly, if the lawyer who as-
sumes the professional responsibility for planning the estate and
writing the will fails to provide expressly for the requirement of
survival in class gifts of future interests, how shall the courts respond
to the ensuing litigation where the issue is whether there is an implied
condition of survival to the death of the client's wife?
Because of recent significant developments, this article will under-
take to deal with the requirement of survival in class gifts of future
interests both with respect to the responsibility of a lawyer who plans
an estate and with the problem confronting the courts in the many
cases where either holographic wills are allowed or lawyers fail to
discharge their professional responsibility concerning this litigious
issue. By way of introduction, it will first stress the importance of a
proper training for professional responsibility in this area. It will
then attempt to provide a proper perspective for the courts to deal
with the unfortunate cases.
Historical and traditional values and policies implicit in some of
the rules of construction are compared with the broad scope of
modern death taxes, which include transmissible future interests in the
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taxable estate, and thus tend to favor other rules of construction in
the difficult task of determining whether there should be an implied
requirement of survival. Reference is made to recent, respected com-
mentary in legal literature on this problem and a significant recent
development in the nationally recognized Tennessee Class Doctrine.
Some basic legal concepts with respect to class gifts, future interests
and lapsed gifts are defined and distinguished in an effort to forewarn
of potential confusion. The principal problem areas concerning the
implications of a requirement of survival in class 'gifts of future in-
terests are then surveyed with the suggestion that there are inherent
differences in class designations which suggest differences in probable
intent. There is a special section on the developments in the Tennes-
see Class Doctrine. Following this is a section on estate planning for
the requirement of survival which includes suggestions on forms
which it is believed will avoidc litigation on the requirement of
survival. Lastly, in the unfortunate cases of litigation there is an in-
sistence that rules of construction are mere aids to the court not de-
serving the stature of rules of law, and a plea is made for less emphasis
upon the legalistic approach of stare decisis and more emphasis upon
the finding of fact implicit in the process of judicially ascertaining the
testator's probable intent. The arbitration process is suggested as a
helpful analogy in the unfortunate cases which are litigated.
II. Tim VAL Es INVOLVED
Respected authorities' have referred to the requirement of survival
as the most litigious issue in the law of future interests. Experience in
the planning and writing of wills and other trust instruments makes
one keenly aware of the complexity of the survival problem. As has
been so well said in the broader context of class gifts generally,
The crying need in this field of the law is not for reform of the courts'
technique in handling the problem ... under discussion, nor reform of the
precedents followed by the courts in the solution of the problem .... Rather
the crying need is for draftsmen, educated to the seriousness and difficult-
ness of the task they are employed to perform.2
1. LEA H & LoGAN, CASES oN FuTtnm INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 392 (1961);
2 POWELL, REAL PnoPERTY ff 326, at 716 (1966); Halbach, Future Interests: Express
and Implied Conditions of Survival (pts. 1-2), 49 CALip. L. Rxv. 297, 431 (1961).
See also 5 AwmcRAN LAw oF PRoPERTY §§ 21.10-21.25 (Casner ed. 1952); SnVsS &
Sirr, FuTuRE INTERESTs §§ 575-94 (2d ed. 1956).
2. Casner, Class Gifts to Others than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin," Increase in the
Class Membership, 51 IAv. L. REv. 254, 308 (1937). "Indeed, it would be no
exaggeration to say that of all the moral obligations of the lawyer who undertakes to
prepare a will the obligation of competence is paramount. . . No lawyer should
prepare a will unless he considers himself competent to do so. He should approach
this question with a realization that to the client the will is probably the most
important document of his life . . . . The property may be the result of a lifetime of
effort. Its disposition will have lasting and significant effect both upon those included as
1966)1
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Lawyers who plan estates and assume the professional responsi-
bility for these monumental3 dispositive instruments need first to be
aware of the significance of the survival problem so they can submit
to their clients the alternative consequences resulting from the choice
of whether or not survival to the date of possession shall be a required
condition to transmissibility of a future interest. Second, lawyers who
assume this professional responsibility need to attain a reasonable
skill in the writing of these difficult provisions for future interests, to
make the intention of the donor very clear, and to remain safely
within the permissive framework of the rules of law concerning per-
petuities, marketability, taxation and other public values. A primary
problem with respect to the requirement of survival has been the in-
adequate training of lawyers to counsel, plan and draft precisely
concerning the alternate choices to be made by the client.
Because the requirement of survival is not always thought through
carefully nor expressed clearly, it frequently becomes a litigious issue
within a family group. What should be a desirable and appropriate
perspective or approach on the part of the courts and judges in the
resolution of these controversies? Do these cases call primarily for
an exercise in legal research, i.e., analysis, synthesis, and a rationale of
legal precedent for the purpose of insuring the predictability of re-
sult? Professor Edward C. Halbach, Jr., has recently criticized the
frequently espoused statement that legal precedent "is of little value
in deciding questions concerning the meaning to be attributed to
donative instruments, because such decisions turn upon the particular
facts and language of each case."4 He has urged, instead, that "strong
rules of construction in survival cases not only create a desirable ele-
ment of predictability, but also generally lead to better results."5 While
I have a genuine appreciation for the excellence of Professor Halbach's
discussion of the survival requirement, I am troubled by his emphasis
upon strong rules of construction to "be applied without apology."6
beneficiaries and upon those excluded who might naturally expect or hope to be
included . . . . If the lawyer doubts his ability to produce the best possible will for
the client, he should decline to prepare one." Miller, Functions and Ethical Problems
of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will, 1950 I.L.. L. FoRUM 415, 419. See also CimA'rHAM,
CASES O N Tn LEGcAL PnoFEsSioN 341 (1955).
3. The word "monumental" is used because it is generally impossible to amend
or add to these dispositive arrangements after the death of the testator or settlor of a
revocable trust, or after the effective date of an irrevocable trust. Many, and perhaps
most, lawyers think of writing articles of incorporation as an item of business more
important, or deserving of a higher fee, than writing a will or a trust. I am always
impressed, however, and perhaps appalled, by the finality and great responsibility of
properly drafting these donative instruments, as compared with the amendable articles
of incorporation.
4. Halbach, supra note 1, at 472. It should be noted that Professor Halbach has
since become Dean of the University of California Law School at Berkeley.
5. Id. at 473.
6. Id. at 329.
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It seems to me that he directs the attention of the courts toward re-
search for legal precedent and the formulation of generalized legalisms
rather than toward a recognition that these litigated cases represent
unfortunate failures in lawyer planning and communication, and, there-
fore, should be resolved by the courts as best they can according to
the probable intent of the donor. I am made happier by his question
in a somewhat more limited context, "Why shouldn't a court just ask
what a person who used such language probably meant, instead of
becoming involved in the distinctions between contingent and de-
feasibly vested interests?"" It seems doubtful that an emphasis upon
clarified rules of construction will decrease the number of litigated
cases so long as lawyers unfamiliar with the complexities of class gifts
of future interests continue to write wills and other trust instruments,
and so long as the "higher rule"8 is the rule that the testator's or
donor's intent shall control insofar as it can be judicially inferred. s
Courts need to develop a proper perspective concerning the solu-
tion of construction problems. It is of primary importance to stress
that the only relevant rule of law, as distinguished from a rule of a
construction, is that the donor's intent shall control insofar as it can
be judicially inferred. 10 The initial concern is with the task of de-
termining the disposition desired by the donor. This begins with a
reading of the word symbols used with reference to the objects and
persons involved to ascertain the testator's subjective intent insofar
as it can be reasonably inferred." Two types of ambiguities, how-
ever, tend to arise in the litigated cases. In one, the testator has in-
adequately expressed his intention. An example of this may be a gift
directly, or in trust, to W for life, remainder "to my surviving children."
If at the testator's death his surviving children are A and B, but B dies
during the life of W leaving issue, a construction problem might arise;
the court would then, be called upon to decide whether the word
"surviving" relates to W's death, in which case the issue of B will re-
ceive nothing, or to the testator's death, in which case the remainder
became a part of B's disposable estate, so that the issue of B may
receive one half at W's death as beneficiaries of B's estate. Because
it seems clear that the testator had some intention with respect to
the word "surviving," the ambiguity is characterized as one in which
his intention is inadequately expressed. A second type of ambiguity
arises in cases where it seems clear, or very likely, that the testator
7. Id. at 460-61.
8. Id. at 299.
9. 5 A~mcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.2 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTw f 316, at 664 (1950); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTy § 242 (1940); SIMES &
Sr=rn, FUTURE INTERESTS § 462 (2d ed. 1956).
10. ibid.
11. RESTATEMfENT, PRoPERTY § 241, comment c (1940). See note 9 supra.
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had no subjective intention whatsoever with respect to the subsequent
events that occurred.' 2 An example of this is the case where the
problem is whether or not the word "children" includes adopted
children.
For the solution of both types of ambiguities the courts of our
Anglo-American system have developed rules of construction which
are intended as judicial aids in reaching an appropriate or seemingly
desirable decision. They are not positive rules of law which carry
the obligation of following precedent. Instead, it has been said that
the judicial ascertainment of the intent of the conveyor is a process which
combines an orderly, but somewhat restricted, search for his subjective in-
tent with supplementing inferences of an intent which the conveyor prob-
ably would have bad, if he had addressed his mind to those problems which,
in fact, have arisen out of his conveyance.13
It would thus seem that a proper perspective for courts in the solu-
tion of these unfortunate construction problems is, first to put em-
phasis upon the ascertainment, by reasonable inference, of the tes-
tator's probable intent. Second, the courts should attribute to the
testator an intent consistent with both his expressed plan and one or
more public values generally attributed to testators, such as concern
for marketability of titles, administrative convenience of the probate
process, and, to some extent, the predictability of court decisions. 4
As an implementation of these public values, the courts have developed
broad constructional preferences which can be used selectively as aids
to a reasoned justification of the result reached by judicial inference.
Among these constructional preferences there has been a preference
for vested interests, a preference against partial intestacy, a preference
in favor of maximum validity, a preference for a result consistent with
the public interest, a preference for keeping property among blood
relatives, a preference against disinheriting an heir, a preference in
favor of the use of technical words in a technical sense, 5 and a pref-
erence against implied conditions of survivorship.16 It should be un-
12. Judge Learned Hand is often quoted in dealing with the problem of will
construction in Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 292 Fed. 299 (D.C.N.Y. 1923),
as follows: "I have to do with a situation quite outside of anything which the
testator had in contemplation, and it is therefore obvious that any solution is bound
to be verbal and indeed formal. Yet while it is idle to speculate upon what he per-
sonally would have done had he been able to look ahead, courts have always per-
mitted themselves, within limits, to impute to testators an intent which they could not
foresee." Id. at 304.
13. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 241, comment c (1940). (Emphasis added.)
14. For a discussion of these values see SnwEs & SmI-h, FuTuRE INTERESTS §§ 467-
73 (2d ed. 1956).
15. For a brief discussion of each of these preferences see 5 Am!EICA.N LAW OF
PROPERTY § 21.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
16. Professor Halbach strongly defends this constructional preference. See Halbach,
supra note 1, at 304-12, 327-29, 431.
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derstood, however, that these broad constructional preferences, like
the maxims of equity, sometimes reflect competing values in the
solution of a particular case. The preferences for vested interests and
marketability of titles, for example, may lead to a result opposite to
that reached by the preference for keeping property among blood
relatives; and this problem is particularly relevant to the requirement
of survival in class gifts of future interests. While these public values
and broad constructional preferences are often used by the courts in
deciding cases of ambiguity, it is vitally important to bear in mind
that they are not rules of property law which command obedience.
Instead, they are used by the courts as a part of the rationalizing
process in justification of a particular decision in which the initial
emphasis is upon the subjective intent of the testator. In addition,
the courts indulge in "supplementing inferences of an intent which
the conveyor probably would have had, if he had addressed his mind
to those problems which, in fact, have arisen."17 A failure to under-
stand this will result in a legalistic approach to the problem of con-
struing the donor's intent, with a faulty reliance upon prior cases
involving other testators and donors who were in different circum-
stances, rather than the more realistic approach of asking one's self
what is a reasonable implementation of this particular testator's in-
tention.
The Tennessee Class Doctrine, 8 which had been applied vigorously
by the courts of Tennessee for more than a hundred years prior to the
1966 development in Walker v. Applebury, 9 is a nationally recognized
example of the legalistic approach to a construction problem. Begin-
ning as the construction of a will in an early nineteenth century case,
20
the doctrine soon developed into a binding legal authority, ruthlessly
applied on the basis of stare decisis in all class gifts of future interests
to "children," "heirs," "next of kin," "issue," and the like, to require
survival to the date of possession unless otherwise expressly provided.
2 '
This certainly provided predictability of result at the litigation level,
after it was too late to clarify or amend the gift; but few lawyers
seemed to be aware of the relevance of the doctrine during the
planning and drafting period. The Tennessee Class Doctrine, with
17. See note 13 supra.
18. For the national recognition and discussion of this doctrine see, e.g., 5
AMng CAN LAW OF P.ROPERTY § 21.11 (Casner ed. 1952); Sims & Sm=, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 578 (2d ed. 1956); Halbach, supra note 1, at 305.
19. 400 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1966).
20. Satterfield v. Mayes, 30 Tenn. 58 (1849).
21. For the Tennessee cases and the discussions of this doctrine see Chambers,
History of the Class Doctrine in Tennessee, 12 TENN. L. REV. 115 (1934); McSween,
The Tennessee Class Doctrine: A Spectre at the Bar, 22 TENN. L. REV. 943 (1953);
Trautman, Decedents" Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11
VAND. L. REV. 1237, 1256-58 (1958).
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its emphasis upon legal precedent, seems well qualified to satisfy one
of Professor Halbach's two values-the strong rule tending to insure
predictability of litigation, with a de-emphasis on the "particular
facts" of each case.2 It is contrary, however, to his second value
urging the historical preference against implied conditions of sur-
vival.23
While the 1966 development in Tennessee mentioned above served
as the initial stimulus for this article, investigation of the litigation
reflected by appellate opinions from other states and the recently
published literature prompts the following conclusionary comments
which will be discussed and demonstrated in the balance of this
article. First, there is a need to re-emphasize Casner's comment that
the "crying need" is for draftsmen properly educated for the difficult
job of planning and writing with respect to class gifts. 24 Second,
there seems to be an unfortunate tendency in many other states in
addition to Tennessee to over-emphasize rules of construction to such
an extent that they are converted into rules of property law; hence
the energies and efforts of judges are directed toward legal research,
stare decisis, and the predictability of future cases, rather than the
more realistic role of an arbitrator of an unfortunate ambiguity in
a writing, where the inquiry should be to determine what would be
a reasonable implementation of a particular donor's intention.5 And
third, with respect to the requirement of survival in class gifts of
future interests, absent an express requirement of survival, (a) there
seem to be inherent differences between class gifts of future interests
to "children" and the like and gifts to "heirs," "next of kin," "issue,"
and the like, where the requirement of survival may seem fairly im-
plicit; hence it would seem to be unwise for the courts to formulate
a constructional preference against implied conditions of survivor-
ship in all class gifts of future interests; (b) in view of modern estate
and gift taxation, it can be argued that a condition of survivorship to
the termination of the preceding estate should be the constructional
preference because the testator may be presumed to have intended
an avoidance of unnecessary tax shrinkage; 26 and (c) in many of the
litigated cases where the requirement of survival is not expressed it
seems to be a reasonable guess that the donor envisioned an ultimate
distribution among blood relatives then comprising the family group
rather than a distribution through a remainderman's estate to unknown
22. Halbach, supra note 1, at 319, 328, 471-73.
23. Id. at 307.
24. Casner, supra note 2, at 308.
25. See, e.g., In re Patterson's Estate, 227 Mich. 486, 198 N.W. 958 (1924).
26. 5 Amucm LAW oF PnoPERTY § 21.3a (Casner ed. 1952); BnIN & HAsxELL,
PREFACE TO ESTATES iN LAD AND FuTuRE INTERESTS 129-30 (1966).
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family groups.Y Since Casner's comment has been re-emphasized in the
paper, the discussion hereafter will demonstrate the second and third
comments above by a survey of the types of gifts of future interests
in which survival may be reasonably implied, an analysis of the 1966
development in which the Tennessee Class Doctrine was rejected as
a rule of law, and a discussion of modern estate planning values and
considerations which suggest that survival to the date of distribution
should be expressly required.
III. Soim BAsic CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS DISTINGUISHED
Before making a survey of the problem areas in which survival may
or may not be reasonably implied in class gifts of future interests, it
may be helpful to state some fundamental principles with respect to
the meaning of "future interest" and "class gift" and to distinguish the
doctrine of "lapse" with respect to class gifts. The latter involves a
no-gift situation, a failure to make an effective gift, according to the
common law concept, although statutes in some states frequently pro-
vide for substituted gifts within prescribed limitations. As will be
seen, however, the language used in some old, but popular, treatises
which discussed the doctrine of lapse as applied to class gifts generally,
whether of present or future interests, is remarkably similar to the
language to be used in discussing the requirement of survival in effec-
tive gifts of future interests to a class. This similarity has misled many
lawyers and judges who were doing legal research on whether survival
is an implied condition.
A. The Meaning of Future Interest
The only thing future about a legally recognized future interest is
that the privilege of possession or enjoyment is postponed to a future
date. It is a presently recognized interest in property. Those future
interests which are indefeasibly vested are often the subject of com-
mercial transactions before they become present interests. Suppose A
transfers property worth 100,000 dollars to B for life, remainder to C
in fee simple, and that B is 60 years of age. A has made a gift of a
present interest to B worth approximately 40,000 dollars, and a gift
of a future interest to C worth approximately 60,000 dollars, the value
of the remainder approximating, in percentile, the age of the life bene-
ficiary under the interest rate assumed in the Federal Estate and Gift
27. BERGIN & HAsyELL, op. cit. supra note 26. In Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368,
52 N.E. 934 (1898), the remainder was to be divided upon the death of the widow
"amongst my children and their descendants." The decedent was survived by his
widow, his son and three daughters. The son predeceased the widow, however, leaving
a widow but no issue. The court held that the son was not required to survive the
testator's widow, so that his interest was transmissible under the intestate laws, and
the son's widow was entitled to partition.
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Tax Regulations.2 C can frequently sell or mortgage his future interest
during the life of B. A lapsed gift, however, is never a gift of a future
interest because a lapsed interest never really becomes a presently
recognized interest in the property; it has failed to become an effective
gift.
B. The Meaning of Class Gifts
A gift to a class is intended as a gift to a described group rather
than a gift to specifically named individuals. The basic concept is
that when a group description is used, the donor intends to benefit
the persons who comprise the group at a designated time. Thus, when
a donor writes in his will a gift "to my nephews and nieces," it is
generally interpreted to mean that the donor intends to make the
gift at its effective date to those persons who are then his nephews
and nieces; the effective date of the gift is intended to be the date of
his death. This is said to be a gift of a present interest to the class
because not only are the individuals who comprise the group identified
at the effective date of the gift, but also their right to income, posses-
sion and present enjoyment of the property begins as of its effective
date. A donor may write in his will, however, a gift "to W for life,
remainder to my nephews and nieces." Beginning with its effective
date, there is a present gift to the group of a future interest. While
the gift became effective at the death of the donor, it is intended that
possession and enjoyment by the individuals comprising the group will
not begin until a future date, that is the termination of the life estate of
W. It may be assumed that the donor knows who his nephews and
nieces are at the time he writes his will and that he could have named
them specifically at that time as A, B, C, and D. It is vitally important,
however, to understand the different consequences and problems
which follow from the employment of the group designation as dis-
tinguished from an intended gift to specifically named individuals.
If a testamentary gift is intended, the effective date of gift is itself a
future date-the date of death. Some of the nephews and nieces may
predecease the donor; additional nephews and nieces may be born
between the writing of the will and the donor's death; some nephews
and nieces may survive the donor but predecease W; some may be
born after the death of the donor but during the life of W and either
predecease W or survive her. Lastly, it is possible that some nephews
and nieces may be born after the death of both the donor and W.
Implicit in the use of the class designation to describe one's benefici-
aries is the proposition that there may be some changes in the
personnel who will comprise the group. In a testamentary gift of a
present interest to a class, these changes will take place between
28. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7, Table I and § 25.2512-5, Table I (1958).
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the signing of the will and its effective date as a gift-the death of
the donor. The identity of the persons who comprise the group in
this situation will be finally determined at the effective date of the
gift, so that, according to the common law concept, only those persons
who are his nephews and nieces at his death will be benefited. Where
the class gift is a future interest-to W for life, remainder "to my
nephews and nieces"-the estates or successors in interest of those
who predeceased the donor will likewise be excluded according to
the common law concept of class gifts. There is the additional prob-
lem, however, of whether the persons to be benefitted are to be finally
identified at the effective date of the gift, i.e., the donor's death, or
whether this determination is to be further postponed until the date
of W's death when possession and enjoyment of the property will be
distributed. Thus, it becomes very important to make clear in the
writing of the will the exact date or dates when the persons to be
benefitted are to be identified.
When the class gift is a future interest, who shall be allowed to
be included as beneficiaries? Should it be only those who were
nephews and nieces at the effective date of the gift-the donor's
death, or all of those plus all who were born before the death of W?
Shall those born after the deaths of the donor and W be included,
or shall the group be limited to those who survived to the date of
distribution? The answer of the law is quite simple and clear-the
donor may choose. There is no rule of law which decrees that it
shall be determined one way or another. Indeed, the only relevant
rule of law is that the donor's intent shall control, and the problem
arises only because the donor's will fails to indicate his choice. What
should the courts do in such a situation? At the death of W there
is an obvious need for some decision concerning those persons entitled
to a division of the property. It is in this situation where a rule of
construction sometimes comes to the aid of the court by attributing
to the testator an intent which probably would have been satisfactory
to him had he addressed his mind to the problem. Actually, the
constructional preference may be dictated by a policy of administra-
tive convenience in probate administration, but it is attributed to the
testator as a presumed, supplementary intent, absent evidence indicat-
ing a contrary intent. The rule of construction is that, absent a show-
ing of contrary intent, maximum membership in the class will be
determined as of the time that a division needs to be made. Thus, in
a gift of the present interest "to my nephews and nieces," the persons
comprising the group will be identified at the testator's death; where-
as, in the class gift of a future interest "to W for life, remainder to my
nephews and nieces," the persons who benefit will include not only
those living at the testator's death but also-those who were born prior
1966 ]
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to W's death. Absent a contrary intent, the maximum membership in
the group is thus determined by a constructional preference dictated
by the convenience of probate administration.
In the example above, where the gift is to "W for life, remainder
to my nephews and nieces," if survivorship to the date of distribution
is not a required condition of the right to participate in the division
of the property, then the nephews and nieces alive at the testator's
death are said to have vested, transmissible interests subject only to
partial divestment through increase of the class by the birth of
additional nephews and nieces prior to W's death. If one of those
should die during the life of W, his share, upon ultimate distribution,
will be distributed to his wife or other successors in interest who
may not be related to the testator. If, however, survivorship to the
date of distribution is a required condition, then the death of one of
those during the life of W will result in the complete elimination of
his interest; therefore, his wife or other successors in interest will not
participate. Exactly the same result will occur whether we say that
survivorship to the date of distribution is a condition precedent to
the right to participate, or that the nephews and nieces alive at the
testator's death had vested interests subject not only to partial divest-
ment by the birth of additional class members, but also subject to
complete divestment by the failure to survive to the date of ultimate
division. While the difference between having a contingent interest
or a vested interest subject to defeasance is important in problems
involving perpetuities, alienability, destructibility, and creditors'
rights, for our problem at the litigation level, it matters not whether
we say that survival is a condition precedent or a condition sub-
sequent. The problem is merely whether or not survival is a required
condition, in any respect.
C. The Problem of Lapse Distinguished
Assume a gift "to my nephews and nieces"; at the execution of the
will the donor had five nephews and nieces, and thereafter one of
them predeceased the donor. In logic and according to the common
law rule, the doctrine of lapsed gifts has no application to the doctrine
of class gifts.2 By the use of the group designation, the testator
manifests an intention to make a gift only to those persons who
comprise the group at the effective date of the gift-that is, at the
death of the testator. Therefore, by definition, the use of the class
concept excludes a potential member who has died prior to the effec-
tive date of the gift. The same result is reached if there has been a
29. SLm.is & Sisrri, FUTURE INTEREsTS § 661 (2d ed. 1956), and cases cited there-
in. See Casner, Class Gifts-Effect of Failure of Class Member to Survive the Testator,
60 HAJv. L. REv. 751 (1947).
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class gift of a future interest, e.g., "to W for life, remainder to my
nephews and nieces"; a nephew who has predeceased the testator is
not a member of the designated group to whom a future interest gift
was effectively accomplished. If instead of using the group descrip-
tion the testator had specifically named his nephews and nieces alive
at the execution of the will, then there would be a common law
lapse resulting in an intestacy or an increase in the residuary estate.
In the case of a class gift, however, there is no common law lapse;
there is simply a gift to the group on the effective date of the gift,
and this is true whether the gift to the class is of a present interest or
a future interest.30 In most jurisdictions, however, statutes have been
enacted providing that in certain cases legacies or devises shall not
fail by reason of the fact that the legatee or devisee dies before the
testator.31 In some of these, the lapse statute has been made expressly
applicable to class gifts.32 Where this is not so there has been much
litigation, with a majority of the courts holding the lapse statute
applicable as a rule of construction where a potential member prede-
ceases the testator.33 The fluctuation in the potential membership of
the class between the execution of the will and the testator's death
is not, strictly speaking, a problem of class gifts; there is no gift at
all until the testator's death. Instead, the problem is solely one of
lapse and the lapse statute. The class gift is initially made as of the
testator's death to those persons who then comprise the class, that is,
those who survive the testator; and in the case of a class gift of
future interests, survival may be required additionally to the future
termination of the life estate or date of distribution.
The problem concerning survival of the testator is thus very differ-
ent from the problem of whether or not one of those receiving a class
gift of a future interest, who did survive the testator, is also required
to survive the life beneficiary. A failure to understand this difference
has led lawyers and judges astray in several states,34 and it is the
original basis for the unusual and exceptional direction taken by the
Tennessee cases in the development of the Tennessee Class Doctrine.
The doctrine originated in the mid-nineteenth century case of Satter-
field v. Mayes. In that case, there was a testamentary gift to B
30. SIMES & Si.rnm, FUTURE INTERESTS § 661 (2d ed. 1956).
31. These statutes are collected in RESTATEMENT, PRaOPERTY § 298, comment c
(1940) and brought up to date as of January 1, 1947, in RESTATEMENT, PoPERTY § 483
(Supp. 1948). See also SIMES & SMrrT, FuTtrE INTEREsTs § 662 (Supp. 1965).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306 (1956). Other states in this category are listed in
Snm.s & S~mrrH, FUTUnE INTERESTS § 662 (2d ed. 1956). The statutes are not uniform.
33. Smms & Sitm=, FTrin-E INTERFSTS § 662 nn.40 & 41 (2d ed. 1956).
34. See the criticism by Professor Halbach of the dissenting opinion in In re Stan-
ford's Estate, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957), in 49 CAiaF. L. REv. 297, 298,
310-11 (1961).
35. Supra note 20, at 59.
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for life, and after her death, the property was to be equally divided
among her daughters. B had five daughters who survived the testator,
three of whom survived B. Upon B's death the administrators of the
two deceased daughters sought shares of the property. While the
lower court held that the remainder vested equally in the five daugh-
ters, and that the interests of the two who died before B's death were
transmissible to their personal representatives, the Supreme Court
reversed and held that survival to the date of distribution was a
required condition; hence, the property was to be divided only by the
three daughters who survived B. The following quotation has been
iepeated for more than a hundred years as the origin of the Tennessee
Class Doctrine:
The rule is well settled that, where a bequest is made to a class of persons,
subject to fluctuation by increase or diminuation [sic] of its number, in
consequence of future births or death, and the time of payment or dis-
tribution of the fund is fixed at a subsequent period, or on the happening
of a future event, the entire interest vests in such persons, only, as at that
time, fall within the description of persons, constituting such class. As if
property be given simply to the children, or to the brothers or sisters of A,
equally to be divided between them, the entire subject of gift will vest
in any one child, brother or sister, or any larger number of these objects,
surviving at the period for distribution, without regard to previous deaths.
Members of the class antecedently dying are not actual objects of the gift.36
The court cited an earlier edition of Jarman on Wills, and the above
statement is a paraphrase of Jarman's discussion of the doctrine of
lapse with reference to class gifts.Y Note the substantial similarity
of language, however, that can be used in describing the problem of
lapse with respect to a class gift and the problem of whether survival
to the date of distribution is required by those persons who did
survive the testator but whose class gift is a future interest, e.g., "to
W for life, remainder to my nephews and nieces." While the language
seems at first to support the result reached, when it is realized that
Jarman is discussing the common law rule that a gift to a class does
not include persons who predecease the testator, it is clearly apparent
that the court erroneously applied the lapse doctrine to a case where
all of B's daughters survived the testator. The case before the court
was a class gift of future interest, and the question was whether
beneficiaries who survived the testator were also required to survive
to a later date, namely, the death of the life tenant. This is a
separate problem from that concerning lapsed gifts.
36. Ibid,
37. Compare 1 JAPwMA, Wn.Ls 448-49 (8th ed. 1951); MeSween, supra note 21, at
945.
[ VoL. 20
CLASS GIFTS OF FUTURE INTERESTS
IV. Tim REQUIBEMENT OF SuRvwVAL IN FuTuRE INTEREsTs: A
SuRvEy OF PROBLEM AREAS
We have said that by definition a future interest is an interest in
property in which possession is not enjoyed at its effective date or
creation. The most frequent future interest intended to be created
is probably the remainder interest, e.g., to W for life, remainder to A,
B and C, or, remainder "to my children." It may, however, take the
form of an executory interest, e.g., to A "if he attains 21," or "when
he attains 21," or "to be paid at 21," in which the future interest is not
preceded by a prior life estate, but possession and enjoyment is
simply postponed to a future date. The basic problem is to determine
the circumstances in which the owner of a future interest of any
type will be required to survive, not the creation of his interest, but
rather the date after its creation when his future interest is to become
a present possessory interest. Stated in terms of legal consequences,
the inquiry is whether or not the future interest is transmissible in his
estate in the event of his death prior to the time when it is to become
a present interest.
The discussion to follow will survey the principal problem areas
which are (a) construction problems, where the requirement of
survivorship is ambiguously expressed, (b) whether a requirement of
survival is reasonably implicit in class gifts to "children," "grandchil-
dren," and the like, and (c) whether a requirement of survival is
strongly suggested or implied in class gifts to "heirs," "next of kin,"
and "issue," particularly when the designated ancestor of such class
designations is the donor, or someone other than the donee of the life
estate.
A. Construction Problems Concerning Express Words of Survivorship
If the client's decision is that the property ultimately should be
distributed only to those members of the class who are alive at the
termination of the prior life estate, or at the designated future event,
this decision ought to be expressed in words which are free of
reasonable ambiguity. Thus, suppose the gift is "to W for life,
remainder to those of my nephews and nieces who are living at the
death of W and to the issue per stirpes then living of deceased
nephews and nieces, the issue to take the share that their deceased
parent would have taken if living." It is believed that this limitation
is reasonably free of ambiguity concerning the requirement of survival.
Suppose, however, that the gift is to W for life, remainder "to my
surviving nephews and nieces." There has been a considerable amount
of litigation over these words, or their equivalent, concerning whether
the word "survival" refers to the death of W or the death of the
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testator.- While in probably a majority of states there is a presump-
tion, and thus a rule of construction, that the words of survivorship
refer to the time of distribution and not the death of the testator,39
there are also several states where there is a presumption (rule of
construction) that, in view of the public preference for early vesting,
the word "surviving" in this context is presumed to mean surviving
the testator.40 Georgia has a statute which provides that in "constru-
ing wills, words of survivorship shall refer to the death of the testator
in order to vest remainders unless a manifest intent to the contrary
appears,"41 and California has a statute which provides that words
of survivorship relate to the testator's death unless possession is post-
poned, "when they must be referred to the time of possession."
'4 2
There are some jurisdictions which resolve the ambiguity without
reference to presumption. While New York has a line of cases in
this category, there is another line of New York cases which indicate
there is a presumption that express words of survivorship refer to the
death of the testator.43 Since the gift to the class is not effective in
any sense until the death of the testator, the use of the word
"surviving" would seem to be surplusage if intended to refer to that
event. In any case, in litigation on this problem it is difficult to see
that a presumption or rule of construction contributes anything more
than a legalistic crutch to be used as a substitute for a reasoned
opinion on the probable intent of the testator in the context of the
words and circumstances of each case. Furthermore, from the number
of recurring cases in states having rules of presumption, it is difficult
to say that these rules help to decrease litigation on this problem.
The important point is that law students and lawyers should learn
38. See the extensive citation of cases from each of several states in Sims & SIITu1,
FUrTUE INTERESTS § 577 (2d ed. 1956).
39. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 353 P.2d 385 (1960); Burden v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 116 Colo. 111, 179 P.2d 267 (1947); In re Winter's Estate, 114
Cal. 186, 45 Pac. 1063 (1896); Phelps v. Seeley, 3 Ill. App. 2d 210, 119 N.E.2d 923
(1954); In re Gautier's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 502, 146 N.E.2d 771, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1957),
For further cases from other jurisdictions see Sims & SmITHr, FuTrum INTEnESTS § 577
n.25 (2d ed. 1956).
40. Bank of Galesburg v. Lawrenson, 240 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Peadro v.
Peadro, 400 Ill. 482, 81 N.E.2d 192 (1948); In re Pleasonton's Estate, 45 N.J. Super.
154, 131 A.2d 795 (1957); In re Wolstenholme's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 610
(Orphans' Ct. 1962); SIMES & SILrrrH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 577 n.24 (2d ed. 1956).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-708 (Park 1933).
42. CAL. PROB. CODE § 122.
43. See, e.g., Hall v. Killingsworth, 253 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Jewell v. Graham,
24 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Brown v. Potter, 114 Conn. 441, 159 AU. 275 (1932);
In re Falk's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 247, 107 N.W.2d 134 (1961). For the several New
York decisions some of which resolve the problem without reference to a presumption,
and others which make the reference and depend on it to varying amounts, see Si .Es
& SM=rrr, FuTtRE INTERESTS § 577 nn.31 & 32 (2d ed. 1956).
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to relate the express requirement of survival to the future event, if
that is the client's decision.
B. Class Gifts of Future Interests to Children and Grandchildren
Suppose the gift is to W for life, remainder to A and B, and A dies
during the life of W; or suppose that A wishes to sell or hypothecate
his future interest during W's life. It is doubtful if anyone would
seriously suggest that the testator intended to make survival to the
death of W a prerequisite to the future interests of A and B. To do so
would suggest that all future interests are conditioned upon survival.
If A should die during the life of W, his future interest would pass to
his wife or other successors quite regardless of whether he left issue.
If he should sell or hypothecate, the purchaser would acquire an
indefeasible future interest.
Nbw suppose the gift is to W for life, remainder "to my children,"
or to my son for life, remainder "to his children." When the future
interest is made in the form of a class gift to "children," is there any
justifiable basis for a finding that the testator intended to make
survival of the life beneficiary a condition of the remainder gift?
Is the situation any different than the example above where the
remainder gift is to A and B? Except for cases in Tennessee, in which
the class gift of a future interest was made prior to the effective date
in 192744 of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305,45 the over-
whelming weight of authority is that a class gift of a future interest
to such class designations as "children," "grandchildren," and "nieces
and nephews" does not give rise to an implied condition of survival.46
In appropriate limitations, such as "to son for life, remainder to his
children," if there is one member of the class in being at the effective
date of the gift, the class is said to be vested subject to open for
the inclusion of additional members.
The Tennessee cases on gifts effective prior to 1927 will be dis-
44. Remarkably, a reference to the Public Acts of Tennessee for 1927, Chapter 13,
indicate that the statute was "Passed March 29, 1927," but was "Approved March 21,
1927" by the Governor. Whatever the significance of these apparently inverse dates,
any question of validity would probably be affected by the official legislative journal
and re-enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated as an official code in 1955. See Tenn.
Public Acts, ch. 6 (1955). If the court is going to apply this statute prospectively,
however, it will become important to know the exact date on which the statute became
law.
45. Walker v. Applebury, 400 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1966), indicates clearly that TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-305 (1956) will be applied to gifts effective after the date of that
statute, and as a result there will be a new rule for class gifts of future interests made
since 1927 in Tennessee. Under the new rule the class will be held to be vested and
transmissable unless the circumstances, including the language, indicate a different
interest.
46. See the large number of cases collected in SNiEs & S-xjrrH, FUTURE INTERESTS
§§ 146, 578 (2d ed. 1956).
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cussed in a separate section of this article. For the present it will
suffice to say that there are several cases where the class gift of a
future interest was "to my childen, "4  or to daughter for life, "re-
mainder to her children."48 The Tennessee Class Doctrine, based
erroneously on Jarman's discussion of the lapse doctrine as applied
to class gifts, has been applied mechanically on the theory of a legal
presumption that there is intended an implied condition of survivor-
ship to the date of distribution in every class gift of a future interest,
regardless of the type of class designation. Thus, the legalistic rule
of presumption was harshly applied to disinherit the successors in
interest-often issue of children who died during the life estate. These
are cases in which there is no apparent basis for inferring an intent
on the part of the testator to require survival. Instead the emphasis
is wholly upon a legalism, a rule based upon legal precedent, rather
than upon an inquiry as to whether or not there is some factual
basis for ascertaining the testator's intent.
As indicated in the great majority of decisions in America, 41 class
designations such as "children," "grandchildren," "nephews,. "nieces,"
"daughters," "sons," and the like, do not suggest an intention to
require survival to the date of distribution. If there is no other
evidence of such an intention, a court ought not to infer such a
requirement.
C. Class Gifts of Future Interests to "Heirs," "Next of Kin" and "Issue"
A requirement of survival may be substantially indicated by the
testator in describing the class of persons intended by the gift of a
future interest. The thought often intended to be communicated is
that the property should be divided at the end of the life estate
among those persons who at that time are the nearest blood relatives,
or those blood relatives who would inherit under the laws of intestate
succession if the ancestor had died at the termination of the prior
estate or at the future event. Sometimes these class designations are
used as the originally designated remainder-e.g., to A for life, re-
mainder to his heirs,50 in a jurisdiction where Shelley's Rule has
been abolished, or to W for life, remainder to "my heirs." Sometimes
they are used as descriptions of alternative remainders-e.g., to W for
life, remainder to our children or their issue. In other cases, they are
used as end limitations after a series of alternative contingent
remainders-e.g., to W for life, remainder to A if then living; if A
47. E.g., Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, 148 S.W. 1042 (1912).
48. Sanders v. Byrom, 112 Tenn. 472, 79 S.W. 1028 (1904); Satterfield v. Mayes,
supra note 20, the original authority for the Tennessee Class Doctrine, was such a case.
49. Supra note 46.
50. It is assumed that the word "heirs" is used in its technical sense and not as a
substitute for "children" or "issue."
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is not then living, to B if then living; if B is not then living, to C if
then living; if neither A nor B nor C is living at the death of W, to
Ws heirs (or next of kin). That survival of the designated ancestor is
fairly implicit is generally agreed.51 There are particular problems with
each designation which should be understood, however, and dealt
with expressly.
1. Class Gifts to "Heirs" and "Next of Kin."-The easiest problem
is to A for life, remainder to the heirs of A in a jurisdiction where
Shelley's Rule is not applicable. Survivorship of A is a required condi-
tion of the right to participate whether (as is said in the great majority
of jurisdictions) survivorship is a condition precedent, or (as the
New York doctrine of Moore v. Litte 52 declares) those who would
be heirs if the life tenant were to die at any given moment are said
to have vested remainders subject to being divested by their failure to
survive the life tenant.
The more frequent case, which is often so troublesome, is illustrated
by the following simple gift, either as a direct gift or in trust: to W
for life, remainder to "my heirs" (or next of kin). In a recent sig-
nificant case in Tennessee the gift was to H for life, "and at his death
back to the Appleburys."53 Since the testatrix was an Applebury and
there were no children, the gift may be interpreted as a remainder
"to my heirs." Where the ancestor is not the life beneficiary there
is the problem as to whether "heirs" or "next of kin" are to be
determined actually at the death of the named ancestor, or, as
probably should have been expressly provided, as if the ancestor
had died at the death of the life beneficiary. In the latter case,
survival of the life tenant is a required condition. In the above
example, to W for life, remainder "to my heirs," at the testator's
death his heirs may be W, and brothers X and Y. If the phrase "my
heirs" is interpreted literally, W, X, and Y have indefeasibly vested,
transmissible remainders; and each could dispose of his interest to
one who is not related to the testator. Another interpretation could
be that X and Y have vested remainders subject to being divested
by a failure to survive W. While heirs are usually determined at the
death of a designated ancestor, 54 when the testator's sole heir is the
life beneficiary, the incongruity has caused several courts to hold that
heirs are to be selected as if the ancestor had died at the date of
51. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 249 (1940).
52. 41 N.Y. 66 (1869).
53. The decedent wife was an Applebury, and the land given to her husband for
life had been inherited by her from the Applebury family. See Walker v. Applebury,
supra note 45.
54. E.g., In re Newman's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 420, 229 Pac. 898 (Dist. Ct. App.
1924); Michigan Trust Co. v. Young, 347 Mich. 78, 78 N.W.2d 581 (1956).
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distribution.55 When the life beneficiary is one of several heirs of the
testator, the Restatement finds that "no constructional tendency is
sufficiently definite to be capable of statement."56
A class gift to the heirs of the life beneficiary clearly requires
survival of the life beneficiary. A class gift to the heirs of a living
person who is not the life beneficiary certainly requires survival of
the designated living person. If the designated person dies during
the life estate, however, there is an ambiguity and divergent views as
to whether (1) the heirs of the designated person take indefeasibly
vested remainders, (2) the heirs take vested remainders subject to
being divested by death prior to the life tenant, or (3) the heirs of
the designated person will be determined as if he had died at the
termination of the life estate.57 If the designated person does not
die during the life estate, there is the hazard that the gift will be
invalidated by the rule concerning destructibility of contingent re-
mainders; and in any event, there will be a troublesome reversionary
interest between the termination of the life estate and the death
of the designated person. Without attempting to discuss all of the
difficulties that can be experienced by the gift of a future interest
to the "heirs" of a person other than the life beneficiary, it should
be apparent that it is very necessary to think the problem through
carefully with the client and to express his wishes unequivocally. It
is very likely that he will want to keep the property in the blood
line of a designated ancestor, in which case it should be provided
that the heirs of the designated person (the testator or another) shall
be determined as if he had died at the termination of the life estate.
While the above discussion deals with the requirement of survival,
it is also important to consider briefly the meaning of the words
"heirs" and "next of kin" in class gifts of future interests. When
used as a word of purchase, the word "heirs" is normally construed
as referring to those persons who inherit the real estate of the
ancestor on his death intestate. Thus, there is an implicit reference
to the statute on intestate succession, and the problem is simply to
determine the time as of which the statute shall be applied. The
phrase "next of kin" literally means nearest in blood, and as such its
meaning is determined independently of a statute on intestate succes-
55. In re Rutan's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 592, 260 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953);
In re Latimer's Will, 266 Wis. 158, 63 N.W.2d 65 (1954); RESTATEMENT, PnoPmOIT
§ 308, comment k (1940). But see Loring v. Sargent, 319 Mass. 127, 64 N.E.2d 446
(1946).
56. RFSTATE._fENT, PRoPERTY § 308, comment k (1940).
57. RESTATEMiENT, PROPERTY §§ 308-10 (1940); SnIES & Snu-, FUTUrE INTErESTS
§ 153 (2d ed. 1956) and cases cited therein. See also Halbach, Future Interests: Ex-
press and Implied Conditions of Survival (pts. 1-2), 49 CALIF. L. REv. 297, 431, at 315
(1961)., I
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sion.m Thus, if the testator leaves a sister and a niece (the daughter
of a deceased brother), the sister would take the entire gift; whereas
under the usual statute on intestate succession the niece would take a
share by right of representation. The Restatement, 9 however, and a
substantial number of states, construe "next of kin" to mean those
persons who would succeed to personalty if the designated ancestor
had died intestate at the time the class is to be determined.60 Where
the phrase "next of kin" is used but the gift includes real property,
additional construction problems are presented which should be
initially decided at the drafting stage, rather than at the litigation
stage. The word "heirs" has often been found by the court to have
been intended to mean "children" and "issue."61 There are some
states, such as Tennessee, where the persons who inherit real estate
differ somewhat from those who succeed to personal property, with
different rules concerning the right of representation;62 and occasion-
ally a state adopts a new statute on intestate succession between the
testator's death and the date of distribution when members of the
class may be determined.
From the above discussion it should be apparent that in class gifts
to "heirs" and "next of kin" not only must the date to which survival
is required be made clear, but also the meaning of these words must
be made somewhat more precise in order to avoid ambiguity. The
following is suggested as illustrative: To W for life, and at her death
the remainder to those persons who would have succeeded to my
personal property under the laws of intestate succession then in
effect in the State of Tennessee if my death had occurred at the time
of W's death.
2. Class Gifts to "Issue.-Suppose the gift is to A for life, remainder
to his issue. Suppose that A had children, grandchildren, and great
grandchildren who survived him, and some of each who predeceased
him. In its literal meaning, the word includes all descendants, what-
ever the degree of relationship; hence, all will be included even
though the parents of the grandchildren and great grandchildren are
also living. It would seem to be rare, however, for a testator to
intend that issue of a living child take equally with their parent. Is
there anything in the class gift of a remainder to "issue" which implies
survival? The Restatementn3 takes the position that "issue" connotes
58. For an interesting recent case so holding, see Fariss v. Bry-Block Co., 208 Tenn.
482, 346 S.W.2d 705 (1961).
59. REsTATEmENT, PnoPERnnY § 307 (1940).
60. See cases cited in SnMms & SMITr, FuTuRE INTEREsrTs § 727 n.66 (2d ed. 1956).
61. Id. at §§ 729-30.
62. Compare TENN. CODE AN. §§ 31-101 and 31-102, with §§ 31-201 and 31-202.
63. REsATEmENT, PnoPERT § 249, comment i (1940).
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a requirement of survival. Normally, it is important to write these
gifts in a way which makes clear that the remainder is to issue living
at the date of distribution on a per stirpes basis. Thus, the above
gift should be written "to A for life, remainder to his issue per stirpes
living at his death." Because this seems to be a more probable
construction of the testator's intent, a court may be more willing to
imply a condition of survival even though there are no express words
so indicating. While it has been said that there is an implied require-
ment of survival,64 there seem to be few cases so holding directly. It
has been suggested that if the common understanding accompanying
the use of the word "issue" is that survival to date of distribution is
required, a rule of construction which reflects that understanding is
essential.65 I would agree that a rule of presumption would serve a
useful purpose here because the word "issue" does not inherently
suggest survival as is true of "heirs" or "next of kin."
Suppose the gift is to W for life, remainder "to B or his issue." It is
usually held that B's interest is subject to the requirement of survival,
although there is division as to whether his interest is contingent or
defeasibly vested.66 Suppose, however, an issue of B predeceases W.
Is his interest also subject to the requirement? The use of the
alternative limitation is said to impose the requirement only upon
the takers to be replaced, whereas the alternative takers are subject
to no such requirement unless it is specifically annexed to their
interest.67 Here again it is necessary to consider whether the use
of the word "issue" inherently implies the requirement of survival.68
Arguments can be made that survival is not required by the alternative
takers; and a "rule court" may well hold that an express requirement
as to one beneficiary excludes that requirement as to others, especially
if B's interest is regarded as vested subject to being divested. It would
seem, however, that a court could reasonably find that the testator
intended to keep the property in the family blood line until the
termination of the life estate; hence, the use of the word "issue" in
this context should be held to suggest an intended requirement of
survival.
In summary, while class gifts of future interests to "children,"
"grandchildren," and the like do not imply a requirement of survival
to the date of distribution, class gifts of future interests to "heirs,"
"next-of-kin," and "issue" seem strongly to suggest that the persons
who take are -required to survive the designated ancestor. Where the
64. Smms & SmrtH, FuTuRE INTEnEm § 579 (2d ed. 1956).
65. Halbach, supra note 57, at 322.
-66. 2 PowEtL, REAL Prormau'Y ff 329 n.47 (1950).
67. ibid.
68. See note 63 supra.
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designated ancestor is the life beneficiary, survival is clearly required
to determine his "heirs" and the like. Where the designated ancestor
is someone other than the life beneficiary, it seems to be a reasonable
guess that the donor envisioned a distribution to those blood relations,
e.g., "the Appleburys," who are alive at the termination of the life
estate. It would seem wrong, therefore, to equate class gifts to
"children" and the like with class gifts to "heirs" and the like, or to
suggest that judicial response in these unfortunately litigated gift
cases ought not to be governed by the factual differences so implicit
in them.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TENNESSEE CLASS DocTRINE
The Tennessee Class Doctrine originated in the case of Satterfield
v. Mayes,69 decided in 1849, and has been applied for more than a
hundred years to class gifts of future interests. The doctrine takes a
definite position on all class gifts of future interests, recognizing no
distinction between such class designations as "children," "grandchil-
dren," "nephews and nieces," and the like, which do not inherently
suggest a requirement of survival, and such class designations as
"heirs," "next of kin," "issue," and the like, which seem to suggest
inherently a requirement of surviving at least the designated ancestor
of such groups. A statement of the Tennessee doctrine is that where
a gift is made "to a class of persons . . . and the time of payment or
distribution of the fund is fixed at a subsequent period.., the entire
interest vests in such persons only as at that time fall within the
description of persons constituting such a class." 70 In class gifts to
children, grandchildren, nephews and' nieces, the doctrine has been
applied mechanically to disinherit the successors of a deceased child
without any effort to analyze the limitation and consider the probable
intent of the donor. This is not to suggest, however, that all the cases
have been decided erroneously, or have reached the wrong results. In-
deed, there are several cases where survival to the date of distribution
was expressly required by the provisions of the will or gift instrument
so that there was no need to resort to the class doctrine in Tennessee.
71
There are several well-reasoned opinions in which the court was
primarily concerned with an appropriate construction and implementa-
tion of the testator's probable intention, and the reference if any to
69. Supra note 20.
70. A quotation from Satterfield v. Mayes, supra'note 20, stated in Burdick v. Gilpin,
205 Tenn. 94, 105, 325 S.W.2d 547, 552 (1959).
'71. Hobson v. Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S.W.2d 659 (1947) (remainder to be
divided between children "then living"); Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535,'73 S.W.
107 (1903) (remainder to children "then living..or descendants bf such children");
Deadrick v. Armour, 29 Tenn. 588 (1850) (remainden to rhildren "then living").
See other cases cited in SYmEs &-SmrrH, FUTUrE INTR ST §.146 n.69 (2d"ed. 1956),
and in McSween, supra note 21, at 952 nn.55 & 56.'
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the legalism known as the class doctrine does not appear to have
been determinative. 72 Also, there are several cases where the rule
was apparently ignored.73 Lastly, the harshness of the rule, particularly
as applied to class gifts of future interests "to my children," spawned a
line of cases which attempt to distinguish gifts of future interests
such as "to W for life, and at her death to be equally divided be-
tween my children, share and share alike,"74 as a gift to individuals
rather than a class gift, so as to avoid the automatic requirement of
survival under the class doctrine. This does not seem to be a mean-
ingful classification, however, because the words "equally divided...
share and share alike" are only descriptive of the distribution process
which would take place without use of such words.
If there is a justifiable criticism with regard to the class doctrine
in Tennessee, it is that it came to be applied mechanically as a rule
of law, and indeed, as a rule of property which could only be
changed by the legislature.5 The emphasis shifted from an analytical
consideration of the testator's probable intent in an unfortunately
drafted gift instrument to research in law with its countless case
citations and quotations. The question is not one of law. It is a
72. E.g., Rinks v. Gordon, 160 Tenn. 345, 24 S.W.2d 896 (1930), where there was a
gift to sister A for life, remainder to sisters B and C and brothers D and E, or their heirs
who may be living at death of A. The word "heirs" was construed as a word of purchase,
not limitation, and the emphasis was on the probable intent. Burdick v. Gilpin, supra
note 70, put the emphasis on the testator's probable intent although the class doctrine
with legal authority is discussed at some length. In this interesting case, the gift was in
trust for three daughters for the life of A, one of the daughters, the income to be paid
quarterly. If a daughter died during the trust, the income was to be paid to her
surviving issue per stirpes. At the end of the trust, the fund was to be divided and
distributed to each daughter or her issue. A daughter died during the trust, and then
one of her children died during the trust and the problem was whether the grandchild
had a transmissible interest, since she had been receiving income since her mother's
death. The court required survival notwithstanding the income interest.
73. Frank v. Frank, 120 Tenn. 569, 111 S.W. 1119 (1908); Ward v. Saunders, 35
Tenn. 387 (1856).
74. Bridgewater v. Gordon, 34 Tenn. 3, 5 (1854), which was decided five years
after Satterfield v. Mayes, 30 Tenn. 58 (1849); Harris v. Alderson, 36 Tenn. 250
(1856); Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289 (1901); Smith v. Smith, 108
Tenn. 21, 64 S.W. 483 (1901); Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601
(1947); Harris v. France, 33 Tenn. App. 333, 232 S.W.2d 64 (1950). This last case is
not strictly a future interest. The gift was of land in trust to pay the income annually
to the children of certain named nephews and nieces, the trust to continue until the
youngest of such children attains thirty years of age. The problem was the rule against
perpetuities, and the court held the gift vested at the testator's death subject to open-
thus a gift of a present interest.
75. Pugh v. Frierson, 221 Fed. 513 (6th Cir. 1915); Jennings v. Jennings, 165 Tenn.
295, 54 S.W.2d 961 (1932); Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, 148 S.W. 1042 (1912);
Sanders v. Byrom, 112 Tenn. 472, 79 S.W. 1028 (1904); Cutshaw v. Shelley, 13 Tenn.
App. 580 (1931); Chambers, History of the Class Doctrine in Tennessee, 12 TENN.
L. REv. 115, 118 (1934). "Nevertheless, the rule as we have applied it is so firmly
established in our decisions, that this Court must abide by it under the doctrine of stare
decisis until it is changed by the Legislature." Denison v. Jowers, 192 Tenn. 356,
360-61, 241 S.W.2d 427, 428 (1951).
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question of fact, and the only relevant rule of law is that the testator's
intent shall control. Both in cases where the testator's thoughts are
inartistically written, and in cases where it seems that he had no
thoughts or intention concerning the problem at hand, the function
of the court is only to resolve, as best it can, an unfortunate problem
in a way consistent with what seems to be the probable intent of the
testator, assuming he had considered the problem. It is believed that
courts perform a better service in these unfortunate cases by adopting
the role of an arbitrator seeking a reasonable implementation of the
donor's probable intent. In the arbitration process, precedent is used
only as suggestive of an appropriate interpretation of a contract, rather
than as a binding precedent. This analogy seems implicit in the
statement often made in these cases that legal precedent "is of little
value in deciding questions concerning the meaning to be attributed
to donative instruments, because such decisions turn upon the partic-
ular facts and language of each case."76 Admittedly, there are certain
public values, such as the preferences for early vesting, keeping
property among blood relatives, early distribution, and the like, which
justify a limited number of helpful rules of construction. But these
should never be allowed to assume the status of rules of law. To
those who call attention to the public value in the predicability of
court litigation, the class doctrine in Tennessee should be an impor-
tant example for it certainly has simplified matters. It contains an
implied condition of survival in all class gifts of future interests, albeit
contrary in many cases to the probable intention of the testator and
a shocking surprise to the family of a deceased child. Appellate
court decisions in Tennessee reveal, however, that it has not elimi-
nated, nor appreciably decreased, the litigation on this troublesome
issue.
Apparently motivated primarily by the harshness of the class doc-
trine as applied to such limitations as "to W for life, remainder to our
children," or "to daughter for life, remainder to her children" where
a child or grandchild of the testator predeceased the life beneficiary
leaving issue,77 the legislature enacted section 32-305 in 1927. It
provides:
Where a . . .gift is made to a class of persons subject to fluctuation by
increase or diminution of its number .. .and the time of payment, dis-
tribution, vestiture or enjoyment is fixed at a subsequent period or on the
happening of a future event, and any member of such class shall die
before the arrival of such period or the happening of such event, and shall
76. See Halbach, supra note 57, at 472. The late Chief Justice Neil in Hutchison
v. Board, 194 Tenn. 223, 231, 250 S.W.2d 82, 85 (1952) construed an unfortunately
drafted deed: "Precedents in cases of this kind, as in cases involving the construction
of wills, are not to be thought of as an infallible guide."
77. See Chambers, supra note 75, at 118.
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have issue surviving when such period arrives or such event happens, such
issue shall take the share of the property which the member so dying would
take if living, unless a clear intention to the contrary is manifested by the
will, deed or other instrument.78
By its terms the purpose of the legislation was to alleviate the effect
of the Tennessee Class Doctrine in only those situations where a
member of the class died before the date of distribution "and shall
have issue surviving."79 This statute alone would not seem to change
the effect of the class doctrine where a class member predeceases
the future event and does not have "issue surviving when such ...
event happens" as was true in Denison v. lowers80 and in the recent
case of Walker v. Applebury.81 It seems inaccurate to suggest, as
have several commentators, that section 32-305 was "apparently de-
signed to eliminate the 'class doctrine' and to put Tennessee in
accord with the common law position."
82
In Denison v. Jowers,83 the testator's will gave all his real estate
to his wife for life, and "at her death, I will shall go [sic] to my
brothers and sisters, or their children if any of them should be dead
and leave children." The testator was survived by two brothers and
two sisters all of whom predeceased his widow, but three of whom
left children who survived the widow. The brother who predeceased
the testator's widow and left no children or issue was survived,
however, by his own widow, who made a deed of whatever interest
she might have in the land to the petitioners. The single question was
78. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 32-305 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
79. It has been said of the Tennessee statute that "in effect, a 'lapse' statute applies
to death of a class member after the effective date of the instrument and before the
end of the postponed period." 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PnoPERTY § 21.11, at 143 (Casner
ed. 1952).
80. Supra note 75.
81. 400 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1966).
82. Sims & SI..rIT, FuTunE INTMESTs § 146, at 150 (2d ed. 1956). In 1934
Chambers said: "It is now the settled law of Tennessee that . . .the 'Class Doctrine'
does not apply to deeds made or wills of persons dying subsequent to the date of
the passage of said Act .... ." The statement seems too broad, although it is clear
that he was concerned primarily about cases where the class member left issue sur-
viving him. See Chambers, supra note 75. For other statements to the effect that the
apparent purpose of the statute was to eliminate or abolish the doctrine, see McSwcen,
The Tennessee Class Doctrine: A Spectre at the Bar, 22 TENN. L. REV. 943, 944, 957
(1953); Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1959 Tennessee
Survey, 12 VAND. L. REv. 1157, 1177 (1959); Warner, The Rule Against Perpetuities,
21 TENN. L. REV. 641, 646 (1951). But compare Trautman, Decedents' Estates,
Trusts and Future Interests-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. REV. 1237, 1257-58
(1958), where a more accurate statement appears about Denison v. Jowers, supra note
75, in which the deceased class member left no issue: "It seems clear, however, that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305, which some thought was designed to
abolish the Tennessee Class Doctrine, could at best have been only a partial solution,
so that it is not surprising that it has been held inapplicable."
83. Supra note 75.
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whether, in a class gift of a future interest, a class member who
predeceases the date of distribution and leaves no issue who survives
to that date, has an indefeasibly vested, transmissible interest which
will pass at his death to his heirs, next of kin, and other successors
in interest. Clearly, Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305 does
not purport to apply to this situation since the class member does
not have "issue surviving when such period arrives or such event
happens." The court held that the deceased brother who left no issue
did not have a transmissible interest; hence the petitioners owned no
interest in the property. In so holding, the court applied the Tennessee
Class Doctrine on the basis "of stare decisis until it is changed by
the Legislature." 4 It is not surprising that the court held that section
32-305 was not applicable;85 but the court surely was mistaken when
it said, in reference to the 1927 statute: "By the passage of ... [this
statute] the Legislature did no more than enact a rule which this
Court had eagerly followed without the legislation," 8 citing a com-
parison of Sanders v. Byrom87 and Tate v. Tate. 8 In the Sanders
case, the result reached under the statute would have been diametric-
ally opposed to that reached by the judicial decision, because the
class owner of a future interest died and left issue surviving who also
survived the life beneficiary and was the plaintiff in the case. In
the Tate case, however, the class owner of a future interest, who
predeceased the life beneficiary, left no issue surviving; hence, the
1927 statute would not by its terms be applicable, as was also true
in Denison v. Jowers.
In Walker v. Applebury,89 decided in 1966, the will of the testatrix
gave certain real estate to her husband for life, "and at his death back
to the Applebury's, .... to the Applebury kin," and in another provision,
"then to the Appleberry [sic] heirs." It does not appear from the
court's opinion whether or not this was a holographic will; but, as is
true in so many of these construction cases, the will was neither
well-planned nor well-written. The testatrix was a member of the
Applebury family, and the land had come to her as an inheritance
through her family; "to the Applebury kin" may be paraphrased to
read "to my heirs in the Applebury family" to equate it with one of
the class designations being discussed. The testatrix was survived
by her husband and a number of Applebury kin among whom was a
84. Id. at 361, 241 S.W.2d at 428.
85. See Trautman, supra note 82, 11 VAND. L. REv. at 1257-58.
86. Denison v. Jowers, supra note 75, at 360, 241 S.W.2d at 428.
87. Supra note 75.
88. Supra note 75.
89. Supra note 81.
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cousin,90 Marvin Applebury, who predeceased the husband-life
tenant. Marvin was survived by his wife and an adopted son, both
of whom survived the life tenant; they were the appellants in this
case. The Chancellor applied the Tennessee Class Doctrine to hold
that survivorship to the date of distribution is a required condition
and that Marvin's death during the life estate terminated his interest
in the land, so no interest was transmissible to his widow and adopted
child. The court of appeals affinned the action of the Chancellor.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, however, holding that by
virtue of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305, the Applebury
heirs, determined at the death of the testatrix, took indefeasibly
vested, transmissible future interests in the land. Since there was no
requirement of survival of the husband-life tenant, Marvin's widow
and adopted son were entitled to a portion of the sale proceeds of
the land. The court based its decision largely on Karsch v. Atkins-9
and Harris v. France,9 both of which stated in unmistakable terms
that
90. While the original opinion refers to Marvin as a nephew, this is corrected in the
opinion on the petition to rehear.
91. 203 Tenn. 350, 313 S.W.2d 253 (1958). This was a gift tax case in which the
Commissioner asserted a tax on a class gift of a future interest on the basis of a Class
B exemption of $5,000 rather than a Class A exemption of $10,000, because the only
member of the class in existence on the date of the gift was an adopted child of the
life beneficiary, and thus not related to the donor. The taxpayer argued that because
the law presumes that a woman is capable of having a child, the Commissioner should
"wait-and-see," and not base the tax on the basis of the life beneficiary's adopted child,
who might not live to the date of distribution. See Trautman, supra note 82, 12 VAND.
L. REv. at 1177-79
92. Supra note 74. This was an unfortunately written will in which the testator
undertook to give his Tennessee real estate in trust to pay the income to "the children"
of twelve named nephews and nieces "until the youngest child of my nephews and
nieces reaches the age of thirty years, and that means whether the children are born
before or after my death," after which it was to be divided, or sold for division,
"among the children of my nephews and nieces above set out." The question was
whether the gift violated the rule against perpetuities. The court held that it was a
gift of a present interest to the individual children of the named nephews and nieces
who were in existence at the testator's death; that these persons took vested, present
interests subject to being only partially divested by the birth of additional children to
the named nephews and nieces. Since it was held that each future child's interest
would vest on birth, and all such children would of necessity be born within the lives
of the named nephews and nieces, plus nine months, the rule against perpetuities in-
volving remote vesting was not violated. If it had been held that survival to the date
of division was a required condition for a distributive share, the gift would lave
violated the rule against perpetuities. Two things should be noted in particular about
this case: (1) while the court discussed the change in the Tennessee Class Doctrine
effected by TENv,. CODE ANN. § 32-305, at 346-48 (1956), it went on to hold that this
was not a class gift at all, but a gift to individuals, thus using the theoretically unsound
escape mechanism of Bridgewater v. Gordon, and cases following it, supra note 74; (2)
viewed as a class gift of a present interest subject to open, if the court had decided
that survival to distribution was a required condition, it would have been a condition
subsequent.
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By virtue of section 32-305, T.C.A., where applicable, the rule now is that
notwithstanding that the time of payment or distribution of the estate is
fixed at a subsequent period, or upon the happening of a future event the
individual members of the class will take vested transmissible interest [sic]
unless the will, considered as a whole in the light of all the circumstances,
manifests a clear intention to the contrary.
93
In Karsch the court went on to say that
It seems to us though from the language of this statute that an intention
to make the remainder contingent must be more or less expressly stated.
As we see it the rule should be, in view of this statute, that the estate will
be treated as vested unless the contrary is expressly provided for in the will.
This is what the statute says-and we must apply it as it reads.9
In Walker v. Applebury,95 however, the court modified this slightly
to say that, because of section 32-305, the issue will be decided by the
following rule:
That the class took a vested transmissible interest in this estate in remainder
upon the death of the testatrix unless, (1) the will taken as a whole, in the
light of all the circumstances, requires the remainder to remain contingent,
and not vest during the life of the life tenant, in order to carry out the
clear intention of the testatrix, or (2) there is language in the will expressly
providing the remainder not vest during the life of the life tenant.
96
Precisely what is the significance of Walker v. Applebury? First, it
makes clear that the court will make a distinction between class
gifts of future interests which became effective after the 1927 enact-
ment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305 and those which
became effective prior to that date; the statute will be applied to
class gifts made after that date. 7 In so holding, the court rejects
the statement in Denison v. lowers98 that by passage of the statute
the legislature did no more than enact a rule followed by the court
without legislation.9 9 Both cases concerned class gifts which became
effective after 1927. Where Denison v. lowers brushed the statute
aside and applied the ancient Tennessee Class Doctrine, in which
survival to the date of distribution is required in all class gifts of
future interests, Walker v. Applebury sets forth a new rule of construc-
tion for post-1927 gifts, going beyond the scope of the 1927 statute,
93. While the quotation is from Karsch v. Atkins, supra note 91, at 354, 313 S.W.2d
at 255, essentially the same words appear in the earlier case of Harris v. France, supra
note 74, at 347, 232 S.W.2d at 69-70.
94. Karsch v. Atkins, 203 Tenn. 350, 355, 313 S.W.2d 253, 255 (1958).
95. Supra note 81.
96. Id. at 869.
97. This had been strongly indicated in the recent case of Moulton v. Dawson, 215
Tenn. 184, 384 S.W.2d 233 (1964), involving a pre-1927 class gift in which the court
applied the old class doctrine.
98. Supra note 75.
99. Id. at 360-61, 241 S.W.2d at 428.
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under which survival will not be required unless the circumstances
justify this conclusion, or the language expressly so provides.
Second, a difficulty arises because the court in Walker v. Applebury
bases its new rule of construction on Tennessee Code Annotated
section 32-305. By its terms that statute seems to apply only when a
member of the class dies before the date of distribution "and shall
have issue servicing when such period arrives or such event
happens."10 In neither Denison v. lowers nor Walker v. Applebury
did the deceased class member have issue surviving. While in the
latter case the deceased class member left an adopted child who was
allowed to participate in the distribution along with the deceased
class member's widow, the court makes clear on the petition to rehear
that it bases the decision on the proposition that the deceased class
member owned a vested, transmissible remainder interest rather than
on the theory that his adopted son qualified as surviving issue. The
opinions in neither of these cases seem to consider that the statute is
expressly limited to cases where the deceased class member leaves
issue surviving the date of distribution; yet the court in Walker v.
Applebury bases its new rule of construction on the statute. In so
doing the court quoted from two cases' 01 and several law review
articles which have said that the 1927 statute was intended to abolish
the Tennessee Class Doctrine, including a 1959 comment of this
writer.102 It seems clear now, as indicated in my 1958 comment,
1 3
that these statements are too broad and, therefore, inaccurate be-
cause section 32-305 seems to be limited to those situations where
the deceased class member leaves issue surviving the date of dis-
tribution. Thus, the statute does not provide an adequate basis
for the court's new rule of construction. Indeed, the statute intro-
100. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
101. Karsch v. Atkins, supra note 94; Harris v. France, supra note 74.
102. See Walker v. Applebury, 400 S.W.2d 865, 867-69 (Tenn. 1966). The court
quotes with some changes from the following commentators: SINsS, FUTUn INTERESTS
§ 76, at 127 (1936); Chambers, supra note 75, at 120-21; McSween, supra note 82, at
956; Trautman, supra note 82, 12 VAND. L. REv., at 1177; Warner, supra note 82, at
646.
103. In 1958 I had the good sense to say in 11 VAND. L. REv. at 1257-58, "It seems
clear, however, that Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305, which some thought
was designed to abolish the Tennessee Class Doctrine, could at best have been only
a partial solution, so that it is not surprising that it has been held inapplicable."
This comment cites Denison v. Jowers, supra note 75, in which the deceased class
member did not leave issue surviving. In 1959, however, I believed the statements in
Karsch v. Atkins, supra note 94, and Harris v. France, supra note 74, and the other
commentators, supra note 102, and I failed to check my 1958 comment above.
The original mistake seems to have been made in the first edition of SIMES, op. cit.
supra note 102, who did not seem to realize that Chamber's conclusion, supra note 102,
needs to be qualified and limited to situations where the deceased class member left
issue surviving. Judge Anderson in Harris v. France cited Simes, Warner, and MeSween;
and Chief Justice Burnett in Karsch v. Atkins cited both Simes and Harris v. France
on the purpose of the 1927 statute.
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duces a "lapse" concept into the problem of survival in an effective
gift of a future interest to a class, rather than stressing the transmis-
sibility of the deceased class member's interest. Suppose the will of
the deceased class member made a gift of his interest to someone
other than his issue?
Third, the rule of construction adopted by the court in Walker v.
Applebury and Karsch v. Atkins is a commendable one. The court
would do well to adopt it as a judicially created and widely recognized
rule of construction, quite independently of the 1927 statute and quite
regardless of whether the deceased class member left issue surviving.
If the court concludes that the probable intent of the donor is that
survival to the date of possession is not a required condition to the
transmissibility of a class member's future interest, whether he sells
it or dies leaving issue seems to be secondary and irrelevant. If the
court believes that the ancient class doctrine should continue to
control pre-1927 gifts, it could, by judicial pronouncement, make its
new rule of construction applicable to gifts which became effective
after the 1927 statute. The theory might be that, since the legislature
went a small part of the way in section 32-305 in 1927, the court
would adopt the broader rule stated in Walker v. Applebury as of the
same date. This would support by court decree, rather than by
statute, the 1936 statement by Professor Simes that "it would appear
that the Tennessee rule ... is now the same as that in force in other
jurisdictions."1' 4 I know of no reason, however, why the court should
feel constrained to limit its new rule of construction to gifts which
became effective after the date of the 1927 statute. The ancient
Tennessee Class Doctrine was judicially created, and it was based
upon an erroneous reading of Jarman's discussion of the doctrine of
lapsed gifts as applied to class gifts of present interests. Furthermore,
the ancient rule was at best a mere rule of construction and not a rule
of law. The only relevant rule of law is that the donor's intent shall
control.
Fourth, it is hoped that the court will improve the statement of its
judicially-created rule of construction to provide that the courts seek
to ascertain the probable intent of the donor in each case and that,
unless the courts become convinced that the donor intended to limit
the enjoyment of the gift to those who are members of the class at
the date of distribution, they consider the future interest as an in-
defeasibly vested and transmissible interest. This puts the emphasis
where it ought to be-on the judicial ascertainment of the probable
intent of the donor in each unfortunate case; and it plays down
legal research, legal precedent, and the small extent to which the
doctrine of stare decisis should be applicable.
104. SIMEs, op. cit. supra note 102.
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Also, the court should realize that it is not likely that one can
generalize the intent of donors of all types of class gifts and class
designations. As indicated in the above discussion which attempted
to survey the principal problem areas, class gifts to "children,"
"grandchildren," "nephews and nieces" do not inherently suggest an
intent on the part of the donor to require survival to the date of
distribution in order for the beneficiaries to be identified and have
transmissible interests. On the other hand, class gifts to "heirs," "next
of kin," and "issue" do seem to suggest that the donor intended that
no one should have a transmissible interest until he survives the
date of distribution and becomes identified as a blood relative entitled
to distribution; transmissibility should accrue only after identification
and distribution in the latter class designations. Upon this analysis,
the specific result reached in Walker v. Applebury may well be
questioned. The will read: after the death of H, the life tenant, "to the
Applebury heirs." Since the testatrix probably could not identify
those of her Applebury kin who would survive H, does it not seem
more probable that the testatrix intended that the identity of her
kin who would benefit be determined at the death of H? Although
the new rule announced by the court in Walker v. Applebury is sound
as a general rule of construction, its specific application in that case
is questionable. It is hoped that the court will give it a broader
base as a judicially-created rule of construction, rather than as an
interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305.
VI. ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE SURVIVAL REQUJIREMENT
It is well said in a leading work10 that the language of the disposi-
tive instrument should make it clear (1) whether there is a require-
ment of survival; (2) if there is such a requirement, to what date the
class member must survive to satisfy the requirement; and (3) if
there is such a requirement what disposition is to be made of the
interest of the class member when he fails to meet the requirement
of survival. It may be a helpful supplement to the above statement to
discuss the alternative choices, to examine some of the problems
involved in each of the above three divisions, and to suggest an
illustrative form.
A. Should There Be an Express Requirement of Survival?
There continues to be a pervasive constructional preference in
property law for vested future interests over contingent future interests
and for early vesting over vesting at a later time.106 The explanation
105. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 521 (3d ed. 1961).
106. BEcIN & HAsKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 129
(1966).
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for this is indeed historical, reflecting original policies and values of
a feudal society which begrudgingly recognized the validity of contin-
gent future interest but held them to be destructible and not alienable,
and subsequent common law policies favoring the free alienability of
land. In this latter part of the twentieth century in America, however,
it is not amiss to say, "beware of any descendible future interests."107
If a person dies owning a future interest which is descendible-that is,
one in which survival to the date of distribution is not required-its
value will be included in his taxable estate for both federal estate tax
purposes and generally for state inheritance tax purposes. These taxes
are imposed upon an owner who has never had possession or enjoy-
ment of the property, 08 and there is frequently a serious problem in
his estate concerning where his executor is going to get the money to
pay taxes attributable to such future interests. Since these tax and
liquidity problems can be avoided by proper planning and drafting
while achieving the same result, we may formulate a standard recom-
mendation: In class gifts of future interests survival to the termina-
tion of all preceding interests in the property should almost always
be required.
If the decision of the client is to require survival, the lawyer who
drafts his gift instrument will want to make this fact crystal clear.
It might be helpful to suggest at this point an example which it is
believed will not only make the requirement of survival clear but
will also serve as a basis for discussing the remaining decisions to
be made:
To T in trust to pay the income to W for her life, and at her death this
trust shall terminate. The trust assets shall then be divided into a number
of like shares equal to the number of my children living at the death of
W and the number of my children who are then deceased leaving issue
living at the death of W, and my trustee shall distribute one of such shares
to each of my children then living and one of such shares to the issue per
stirpes then living of each deceased child. If at the death of W there are
no issue of mine then living, the trustee shall distribute this trust estate at
that time to Alma Mater University for the benefit of its School of Law.
If it is desired, a gift to collaterals can be conveniently inserted
prior to the charitable gift, as follows:
If at the death of W there are no issue of mine then living, the trustee
shall distribute this trust estate to the issue of my parents then living per
stirpes. If there are neither issue of mine then living nor issue of my parents
then living, the trustee shall distribute this trust estate at that time to Alma
Mater University for the benefit of its School of Law.
107. LEAcH & LooAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNrc 23 (1961).
108. Id. at 403.
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It is believed that survival to the death of W is expressly required
in the above examples for those who will benefit from the future
interest.
B. To What Date or Event Will Survival Be Required?
It should be noted that survival to the death of W is made an express
condition precedent in the above example. Thus, there is avoided
what might be called the vested-subject-to-being-divested trap.
While courts tend to discuss the requirement of survival in terms
of the vested-contingent dichotomy, it should be apparent that the
real issue is whether there is intended such a requirement. If it is
believed that there is intended a requirement of survival, it may be
stated in a form that makes it a condition precedent to the right to
benefit in the gift (in which case the future interest is said to be
contingent), or it may be stated more in the form of a condition
subsequent (in which case the future interest will be said to be
vested subject to being divested by the failure to survive the preceding
interests). The trap in the vested-subject-to-being-divested form may
be illustrated by the following example:
To W for life, remainder to my children. If any of my children should die
before W leaving issue, such issue shall take the share of their parent.
Two construction problems have arisen frequently with respect to
this type of gift. (1) Suppose a child of the donor predeceases W
leaving no issue. A "rule court" with a heavy emphasis upon legal
research and legal distinctions will likely hold that the children take
vested remainders which can be divested only by both predeceasing
W and leaving issue; accordingly, the child's interest will be trans-
missible and taxable.109 (2) Suppose a child predeceases W leaving
issue who are grandchildren of the testator, and then one of the
grandchildren predeceases W leaving no issue but leaving a wife.
While the requirement of survival is likely to be placed upon the
testator's child, it is not so clear that a similar requirement will be
placed upon the grandchild." 0 This would have the effect of exclud-
ing from succession the wife of a child, but allowing succession by
the wife of a grandchild. It should be apparent that, when the
divesting form is used, it is necessary to state precisely the divesting
conditions at each level of succession. It seems shorter and much less
complex to state the requirement in the form of a condition precedent
requiring survival to the termination of all prior interests.
When a class gift of a future interest is made to "heirs," "next of
109. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 254 (1940); SiMEs & SMirr, FtrrunE INT=.ETs §
583 n.5 (2d ed. 1956) and cases cited therein.
110. Snms & SMrrH, FutrtmE INTmmSTS § 659 (2d ed. 1956) and cases cited therein.
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kin," or "issue" of a person other than the owner of the preceding life
interest, it is important to choose the date or event to which survival
shall be required. Frequently, this will arise in gifts to H for life,
remainder "to my heirs," or remainder "to my next of kin among the
Applebury family." It can arise also in gifts to W for life, remainder
to the issue of my sister S. If the client envisions that the property will
be distributed to the blood relatives of the ancestor designated, it
should be made clear that "heirs," "next of kin" and "issue per stirpes"
of the designated ancestor will not be determined as of the date of
his death, but rather as if he had died at the termination of the prior
estate. This will require survival to the date of distribution.
C. When the Class Member Fails To Survive, What Will
Be the Disposition?
In the discussion above, an express requirement of survival to the
termination of all prior interests is recommended, and it is also
suggested that the requirement be stated in the form of a condition
precedent to the right to receive a beneficial interest. It, of course,
follows from this that if a potential member of the group dies prior
to the termination of the prior life estate, he is by definition excluded
from the group described and there is no descendible interest in his
estate. It does not follow, however, that there is a risk of disinheriting
one line of the family group, such as the issue of a deceased child,
if the class gift of the future interest to children is properly drafted
so as to require survival to the termination of prior interests. As
indicated in the example above, the class can be designed to include
each child and the issue of each deceased child who satisfies the
requisite condition of survival.
In the gift of any contingent future interest, it is necessary in
estate planning to ask who will receive the property if the con-
tingency fails. In the gift of a contingent future interest to a class,
we are concerned with what will happen if there are no members of
the class who satisfy the described requirements of the class. In the
examples above, it will be noted that there can be an alternative
gift of a contingent future interest to another class in which survival
is required. A series of alternative gifts of contingent future interests
will always leave the possibility, however remote, that none of the
contingencies will become effective, with the result that there will
be a reversionary interest in the donor of an inter vivos gift and in
the estate of the donor of a testamentary gift. It is in this circumstance
that it frequently becomes advisable to give the ultimate contingent
future interest to a charitable beneficiary which is meaningful to
the values of the donor. This is illustrated in the above examples by
the suggested ultimate gift over to the university. In testamentary
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gifts it is important to include such an end limitation in order to
make a complete disposition of the total interests in one's property,
to avoid intestacy upon this remote contingency in favor of distant
collateral relatives often unknown. It also creates a favorable re-
membrance even though the charity is a remote beneficiary. In inter
vivos gifts there are the additional tax problems: (1) the valuation of
reversionary interests can be difficult and time consuming in the
preparation of the donor's estate tax return at his death; and (2) in
those instances where survivorship of the donor may be a requisite
of any contingent future interest, and the reversionary interest of the
donor exceeds five percent of the property, his taxable estate will
include the value of the interest which depended upon survival of
the donor."'
It is recommended, therefore, that, while class gifts of future
interests should be contingent future interests in which the class is
defined to include only those who survive the termination of all prior
interests, a reversionary interest should not be left in the donor or his
estate.
D. The Importance of Making a Complete Disposition
Many of the litigated cases on the requirement of survival arise
because the lawyer who drafted the gift instrument did not realize the
importance of providing specifically for the ultimate distribution of
the trust assets. Provision is often made quite adequately for the life
interest, either directly or in trust; but the lawyer does not always
provide specifically for the ultimate division and distribution among
the successors after the life interest. Instead, this is often left to a
short phrase such as "to my children," "to my heirs," or "back to the
Appleburys," in which many problems are left to vague inferences
and litigation. As indicated by the examples above, by setting up the
mechanism to make the ultimate division of the property, and by
providing specifically how it shall be carried out, the draftsman is
forced to think the matter through and is perhaps more likely to
provide for a complete disposition.
VII. CoNCLUSION
As has been said, the "crying need" in this field is not for reform
in the judicial methods of handling this problem, but rather the
need is for lawyers educated in the drafting of gifts creating future
interests." 2 As long as lawyers write wills and trust instruments
creating future interests to classes of unknown ,persons without care-
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
112. Casner, Class Gifts to Others Than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin" Increase in the
Class Membership, 51 Hv. L. REv. 254 (1937).
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fully thinking through the problem and without providing expressly
for the ultimate division and distribution when the future interest
becomes a present interest, there will be litigation in the courts
concerning the persons to benefit. Likewise, as long as people are
allowed to write holographic wills, e.g., "back to the Appleburys,"
there will be litigation concerning their meaning. Nor will strong
rules of construction applied "without apology,"113 indeed, applied as
a rule of property, be likely to alleviate the litigation over an ambig-
uously written gift of a future interest. Tennessee's century-old class
doctrine has been easy to understand and has been applied without
apology, but it has not prevented people from litigating year after
year. Marvin Applebury's widow and adopted son, who are not
"Appleburys," were finally permitted to participate in the distribution
after two courts said that they could not.
While recent developments in the class doctrine in Tennessee
served as the initial stimulus for this article, its purpose broadened
to include objectives equally applicable to other jurisdictions where
the Anglo-American system of future interests law is being taught
and practiced. In part, the emphasis here has been on the need to
put greater stress upon training lawyers for professional responsibility
with respect to the requirement of survival in class gifts of future
interests. Sophisticated skills in consulting, planning, and drafting
of appropriate gift instruments in this area must be developed so that
the "surgery" of litigation with its consequent "scar-tissue" is less
likely to arise.
With respect to an appropriate perspective for the courts to which
the unfortunately planned gifts come for resolution, the effort here
has been to emphasize that the only true rule of law is the basic
principle that the testator's intent shall control. With this basic prin-
ciple as a guide, the function of the court is to implement equitably
a donor's unfortunately drafted gift instrument in a way in which he
"probably would have"" 4 had the problem been called to his attention.
This is the best service that the courts can render to society in these
unfortunate cases.
The courts should understand the basic preferences and values
traditionally used as aids in construing ambiguities in gift instruments,
but they should never allow such aids, or rules of construction, to
take on the status and force of law. Also, the courts should become
aware of inherent differences in such close and non-shifting groups
as "children" as compared with those groups of blood relatives such
as "heirs," "next of kin," and "issue per stirpes" whose membership
113. Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival (pts.
1-2), 49 CALia. L. REv. 297, 431, at 329 (1961).
114. RE-sTATEmENT, PRoPErY § 241, Comment c, at 1193 (1940).
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shifts beyond the control of the donor and whose precise identity
at a future date is generally unknown to him.
It is hoped that the analogy to the arbitration process may be a
helpful one because it is believed that in the judicial resolution of
the ambiguity, the resolution of other ambiguities concerning donative
intent by other human beings in somewhat similar but different
predicaments can be suggestive only. Orderliness in the prediction
process will not be impaired by a greater emphasis upon an equitable
implementation of the testator's probable intent. Lastly, a careful
look at the digests, the treatises and the advance sheets over a number
of years persuades the conclusion that the traditional emphasis on
rules of construction in this troubled area will not dissuade those who
might be excluded from litigating the ambiguous and inartistically
drafted gift instruments.
